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Borger: Diamonds in the Rough

DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH: A REVIEW OF
TIFFANY V. COSTCO AND A CALL TO APPLY DAUBERT TO
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CONSUMER SURVEY EVIDENCE IN
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
Michael J. Borger *
INTRODUCTION
The illustrious history of Costco Corporation dates back to
1976 when it began its business operations inside of a remodeled
airplane hangar. 1 With its first store located in a small town on the
outskirts of San Diego, the company quickly became known for
pioneering the wholesale membership club concept—a business model
that was originally developed to meet the unique needs of small
business owners. 2 After experiencing great economic success from the
outset, Costco spent the next four decades expanding its business
worldwide into Japan, Mexico, South Korea, France, and several other
industrial countries, becoming recognized as a global powerhouse in
the wholesale market space. 3
Even with fierce competition from Amazon, an online
conglomerate that recently acquired Whole Foods Market and
successfully launched Prime Pantry, 4 Costco shattered the
*J.D.,

Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2018; B.A., Stony Brook University,
2014; Editor-in-Chief, Touro Law Review, 2017-18. I would like to express my sincere
gratitude to Professor Rena C. Seplowitz for her continued support and encouragement
throughout my entire law school career. Her passion for teaching and her enthusiasm for seeing
her students succeed are simply remarkable. I could not have finished this long journey without
her and I am truly blessed that I had her by my side to help me navigate through every single
challenge and obstacle that came my way. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.
1 COSTCO.COM, ABOUT https://www.costco.com/about.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 It should be noted that Amazon acquired Wholefoods Market in August of 2017. See
BUSINESS INSIDER, Whole Foods is overtaking Amazon’s brands with $10 million in online
sales in just 4 months, (Dec. 20, 2017) http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-sells-10million-in-whole-foods-products-2017-12.
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expectations of financial analysts when it generated over $116 billion
in gross revenue for the fiscal year ending in August 2016 and
substantially increased its overall membership in 2017. 5 However,
despite the company’s efforts to earn the trust and respect of its
members by offering them the highest quality ground beef, shredded
wheat, and coffee products at heavily discounted prices, on Valentine’s
Day in 2013, Costco broke the hearts of its loyal customer base when
it was accused of selling its customers nothing more than large
quantities of bulk deception. 6
Nestled behind the large display of gallon-sized tubs of
mayonnaise—and across the aisle from a mob of food vendors offering
free samples of tasty frozen pizza treats—a flashy and attractive
jewelry counter sits at the center of almost every Costco wholesale
club. A variety of men’s and women’s watches, rings, and necklaces
are prominently featured behind the glass case; some of the more
popular and attractive pieces bear the name “Tiffany” and resemble the
same diamond setting that Tiffany & Co. has made famous over the
past century and a half. 7 Well over two thousand Costco customers
may have thought that their local wholesale clubs were merchandising
and promoting the prestigious and exclusive Tiffany & Co. jewelry
brand that has earned world-wide recognition for its high-quality
products and unique ring settings. 8 One Costco shopper with a
particularly keen eye for the famous jewelry brand, however, would
alert Tiffany & Co. of Costco’s allegedly deceitful merchandising
strategy. 9 This complaint quickly prompted the initiation of a multimillion-dollar trademark infringement lawsuit that resulted in Tiffany
5 WALLSTREETJOURNAL.COM, Amazon Hasn’t Crushed Costco Yet and This One New Stat
Proves It https://www.thestreet.com/story/14330149/1/costco-is-amazon-s-biggest-grocerycompetitor-but-its-holding-up-ok.html; COSTCO.COM, https://www.costco.com/about.html.
6 See Complaint, Tiffany and Company v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 13 CV 1041, 2013
WL 541501 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013) (Tiffany & Co. alleged in its complaint that Costco
engaged in “trademark infringement, dilution, counterfeiting, unfair competition, injury to
business reputation, false and deceptive business practices and false advertising” by selling
jewelry labeled and promoted as “Tiffany” in its wholesale stores) [hereinafter “Tiffany
Complaint”].
7 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,
Tiffany and Company v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 13CV01041, 2013 WL 6778365
[hereinafter “Tiffany Motion for Summary Judgment”].
8 Tiffany Motion for Summary Judgment at 3.
9 See Complaint at ¶4 (“In November 2012, a consumer shopping in the Huntington Beach,
California Costco warehouse complained to Tiffany that she was disappointed to observe that
Costco was offering for sale what were promoted on in-store signs as Tiffany diamond
engagement rings.”).
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& Co.’s prevailing on summary judgment, and subsequently being
awarded a jury verdict—including both compensatory and punitive
damages—worth over $19,000,000. 10 The jury calculated this award
based on the factual findings procured by the district court, which held
that Costco infringed upon the good will and reputation that Tiffany &
Co. had established over the past century by promoting and protecting
its luxurious, beautifully designed, globally recognized brand. 11
Specifically, the court found that Costco’s use of the word “Tiffany”
as a stand-alone term on promotional materials and in-store point-ofsale signage, without an attached modifier such as “style,” “set,” or
“setting” attached to it, infringed upon the mark that Tiffany & Co. has
used in commerce since 1868. 12
Following this massive award, both parties submitted briefs to
the district court regarding the damages awarded by the jury. 13 The
court reaffirmed that there was substantial anecdotal evidence of
actual consumer confusion with regard to the rings sold at the
wholesale club as well as evidence that Costco managers were
engaging in bad-faith practices intended to free-ride on Tiffany &
Co.’s success. 14 More importantly, the court reiterated that when
Costco sold jewelry bearing the name “Tiffany,” it created a likelihood
of confusion among consumers in the market for engagement rings. 15
This determination was made following the testimony of Jacob Jacoby,
Tiffany & Co.’s expert witness, and the court’s evaluation of his
consumer confusion survey evidence, 16 the “keystone” element of a
trademark infringement claim. 17
10 Tiffany and Company v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d 216, 227 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (“the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover trebled profits of $11.1 million
. . . and punitive damages of $8.25 million”).
11 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,
Tiffany and Company v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 13CV01041, 2013 WL 6778365
(hereinafter “Tiffany’s Motion for Summary Judgment”).
12 Tiffany and Company, 2017 WL 3485380 at *1(referencing the district court’s summary
judgment opinion and subsequent jury trial for monetary recovery); Tiffany and Co. v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 127 F. Supp. 3d 241, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
13 Tiffany and Company, 2017 WL 3485380 at *1.
14 Tiffany and Company, 2017 WL 3485380 at *3 (giving great weight to evidence that
Costco managers referenced Tiffany & Co. in numerous internal and external communications
in an effort to ensure that the rings it was selling were comparable in price, style, and overall
appearance to authentic Tiffany & Co. jewelry).
15 Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 253.
16 Id. at 249, 253.
17 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1
(5th ed. 2017) (“Likelihood of confusion is the fundamental test of both state common-law

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2018], Art. 10

434

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

To the ordinary observer, it might appear that the court was
justified in allowing the jury to award such harsh punitive damages
against Costco in addition to actual damages sustained by the famous
jeweler. 18 After all, since “Costco is a company with billions of dollars
in annual revenue,” the wholesaler would be hard-pressed to convince
a court that the jury was excessive in its punitive damages award. 19
However, after a closer evaluation of the evidence that Tiffany & Co.
presented at trial to establish consumer confusion and Costco’s bad
faith, there is a strong argument to be made that this evidence was
significantly flawed and should not have been admitted.
In fact, Costco presented the court with genuine, well-founded
objections that called into question the reliability and trustworthiness
of the opinion of Tiffany & Co.’s expert witness, Dr. Jacob Jacoby, as
well as the structure of Dr. Jacoby’s study. Costco argued that the
survey evidence was not admissible because:
(i) it utilized false, built-in assumptions; (ii) it utilized
oversimplified, misleading and erroneous instructions;
(iii) it utilized contrived and artificial stimuli that either
omitted context necessary for disambiguation or
provided false and misleading “context”; (iv) it was
administered to the wrong subject population; (v) and it
did not properly address whether Tiffany was a generic
term for the specific “genus at issue in this case.” 20
Costco also cited to a litany of cases upon which the district court had
previously admonished and reprimanded Dr. Jacoby for utilizing
“flawed,” 21 “unreliable,” 22 and poorly designed surveys that
“reveal[ed] no confusion no matter how confusing the . . . issue
actually was.” 23
The court, however, quickly dismissed these objections
without much explanation, explaining that “[the] criticism of Dr.

and statutory trademark infringement and federal statutory trademark infringement.”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
18 Tiffany and Company, 2017 WL 3485380 at *1 (listing punitive, statutory, and
compensatory damages awarded to Tiffany & Co.).
19 Tiffany and Company, 2017 WL 3485380 at *6.
20 Tiffany and Co. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 127 F. Supp. 3d 241, (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
21 Kargo Global, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 2007 WL 2258688, at 12*
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007).
22 Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
23 Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Jacoby’s survey is just that: criticism.” 24 In fact, there was virtually no
discussion in the lower court that addressed the qualifications of
Tiffany & Co.’s expert, or the reliability of his suggestive, nonscientific consumer confusion survey which led to the massive
monetary award. Rather than excluding the defective survey because
it did not meet the threshold requirements mandated by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the court held that the flaws contained within the
report went to the “weight, rather than the admissibility, of Tiffany’s
consumer confusion evidence.” 25
The outcome of this case is alarming on numerous fronts. First,
the testimony and opinions of expert witnesses, in virtually every other
legal context—whether the expert is a doctor in a drug manufacturer’s
products liability action testifying that defendant’s drug could
exacerbate cirrhosis of the liver, 26 or an engineer with an expertise in
the mechanical workings of farm augers testifying about the process in
which this equipment is used to transfer grain or feed from one location
to another 27—are subject to rigorous scrutiny by the courts. In order
for these expert opinions to be admissible, not only must they satisfy
Rule 403 and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 but they are
also subjected to the extensive Daubert factors established by the U.S.
Supreme Court to ensure that expert witnesses refrain from using “junk
science” to form the basis of their opinions. 29
Surprisingly, neither of these fundamental evidentiary
standards was critically analyzed by the court during the Tiffany & Co.
v. Costco litigation, despite Costco’s vigorous challenges to the flawed
methodology of Jacob Jacoby’s survey which formed the basis of his
opinion. 30 Rather, since the court accepted that consumer confusion
24

Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 254.
Id. at 250-51.
26 See Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2005).
27 See Daniels v. Farmers Elevator and Exchange Co. of Monroe City, No. 2:05 CV 55
DDN, 2006 WL 2632207 (E.D.Mo. 2006).
28 FED R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient
facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”); FED R. EVID.
403.
29 Amorgianos v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002); Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
30 Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (“Costco does not undermine Dr. Jacoby’s
ultimate methodology (i.e., the use of a consumer survey), and certainly does nothing to
25
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survey evidence is a generally reliable and admissible method for
proving the likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement actions,
it refused to exclude the survey, despite Costco’s Daubert challenges
to the methodology and structure of the survey that formed the basis of
Tiffany & Co.’s expert opinion. 31
This author argues that the Daubert factors are applicable to
determining the admissibility of all expert opinions, whether they are
based upon either physical science or social science data, which
include consumer survey evidence. Furthermore, even though
consumer confusion surveys are a generally accepted method to prove
the likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement actions, the
methodology utilized in these surveys must be sound in order for the
survey to be admitted into evidence. Thus, before the courts are
permitted to admit consumer confusion surveys into evidence, these
surveys, as well as the expert opinions that are based on this survey
evidence, must always be subjected to the same Daubert factors
invoked in virtually all other contexts in federal litigation. 32
Part I of this note will provide readers with a brief overview of
trademark infringement actions and explain the critical role that
consumer confusion surveys play in litigation. It will then discuss how
consumer confusion surveys are frequently admitted into evidence,
despite the courts conceding that these surveys are subject to a host of
defects including the suggestiveness, bias, and lack of scientific
methodology, which underlie the conclusions based upon these tests.
This section will also discuss instances where the courts have allowed
the admission of relatively weak anecdotal evidence of actual
confusion to prove trademark infringement. Part II of this note will
discuss the rigorous standards set forth by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
demonstrate that Dr. Jacoby has reached his conclusions by engaging in unreliable ‘junk
science.’”).
31 Id. at 258-59.
32 See LVL XIII Brands, Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 209 F. Supp. 3d 612, 643
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (readily applying the Daubert factors in a trademark infringement action to
exclude expert testimony based on faulty, unreliable survey methodology); but see Scotts Co.
v. United Industries Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (refusing to evaluate defendant’s
argument that plaintiff’s consumer confusion survey was inadmissible pursuant to Daubert
because it agreed with the defendant’s alternative argument that the survey simply did not
prove likelihood of consumer confusion); see also Jack P. Lipton, The Use and Acceptance of
Social Science Evidence in Business Litigation after Daubert, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 59
(arguing that in business and commercial litigation especially, the Daubert factors are
frequently ignored, resulting in judicial determinations as to the weight of the survey evidence
rather than its overall admissibility); see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:2.75 (5th ed. 2017).
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 33 the landmark Supreme Court case used to
evaluate the sufficiency and admissibility of an expert witness’s
opinion testimony in all federal litigation. It will then evaluate the
admissibility of consumer confusion surveys and highlight some of the
issues that consumer confusion surveys present to the trier of fact when
they are subjected to the Daubert factors. Finally, this section will
outline the parameters and structure of a permissible consumer
confusion survey. Part III will discuss the Tiffany & Co. v. Costco
litigation, and specifically focus on the questionable anecdotal
evidence of actual confusion used to prove infringement as well as the
flawed and unreliable survey used by Tiffany & Co.’s expert witness
to prove the likelihood of consumer confusion.
I.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF SURVEY
EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION
A.

A Brief Overview of Trademark Law and
Infringement Actions
i. The Function of Trademark Law

The essential purpose of trademark law is very straightforward
and to the point: protect consumers from being deceived or confused
while making purchasing decisions in the marketplace. 34 The law
recognizes the enormously influential and “psychological value” of
trademarks which serve as powerful “merchandising shortcut[s]” that
are capable of “induc[ing] a purchaser to select what he wants, or what
he has been led to believe he wants” in the marketplace. 35
Manufacturers and distributors regularly exploit the value of their
distinctive marks by utilizing them to distinguish their brand in
virtually every possible marketspace—from pink insulation36 to
medicinal products 37—because these marks readily “help consumers
identify goods and services that they wish to purchase, as well as those
they want to avoid.” 38 In addition to protecting consumers in the
33

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 636 (1st Cir.
1992).
35 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
36 See In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
37 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
38 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
34
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marketplace, a secondary—and perhaps just as important—purpose of
trademark law is protecting the good will that manufacturers and
distributors have established through investing large sums of money
into advertising and marketing campaigns, quality control, and the
development of their products. 39
Although the courts regularly enforce the legal rights that mark
holders have acquired through their continuous use of the mark in
commerce, the initial burden placed on the plaintiff in an infringement
action is to prove that the mark is deserving of trademark protection.40
This initial judicial inquiry is fundamental in establishing a mark
holder’s rights and is a very familiar concept that runs throughout
intellectual property law. Where copyright law focuses on the
“originality” of creative and artistic expression, 41 and patent law
focuses on “novelty” of utilitarian inventions, 42 the threshold inquiry
in determining the validity of a trademark is the “distinctiveness” of
the mark, symbol, logo, phrase, color, or device that is being used to
convey a “merchandising shortcut” to the consumer public. 43
ii. Registration of Trademarks
In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 44 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated a
39 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual
Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1460 (2002) (“Despite the different economic and legal
theories underlying them, however, we contend that both patents and trademarks allow firms
to appropriate the benefits of investment in Research and Development (“R&D”) and product
quality.”).
40 Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Opening Day Productions, Inc., 385 F. Supp.
2d 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
41 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 351, 362
(1991) (explaining that “originality is a constitutionally mandated prerequisite for copyright
protection” and denying copyright protection to a list of names and home addresses in a
phonebook because it “lack[ed] the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere
selection into copyrightable expression”).
42 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989) (“Taken
together, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements express a congressional determination
that the purposes behind the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation
of either that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily discerned
from publicly available material.”).
43 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining
that distinctiveness is a function of whether the mark is generic, descriptive, suggestive, or
arbitrary and the amount of the protection offered to the mark holder varies depending on
which of these categories the mark falls into); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
44 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
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systematic approach to evaluating the protectability of trademarks that
has become known as the “Abercrombie spectrum of
distinctiveness.” 45 In this landmark case that has guided courts
throughout all of the federal circuits, the Second Circuit explained that
there are ultimately four categories of marks that trademarks can be
categorized as: generic marks, descriptive marks, suggestive marks,
and marks that are arbitrary or fanciful. 46 Depending on the category
that a mark is placed into, the law provides varying levels of protection,
evidentiary presumptions, and shifting burdens placed on the parties. 47
On the far end of the spectrum lie marks that are categorized as
arbitrary or fanciful. These marks are entitled to receive a legal
presumption of distinctiveness, the highest level of protection that a
mark can attain, which gives the mark holder prima facie evidence of
validity. 48 The Kodak mark, for example, when used in the
photography industry to identify the source of camera film and other
camera accessories, is a mark that is considered fanciful, and thus,
inherently distinctive, because the content of the mark itself has
absolutely no association or logical connection with the product on
which it is placed. 49 If a mark is arbitrary or fanciful in a particular
marketplace, no other evidence is required to satisfy the plaintiff’s
initial burden of proof as to the mark’s validity.
In contrast, generic marks, which are marks that simply refer
to a “genus of which the particular product is a species,” can never
obtain trademark protection, no matter how much money and effort the
mark holder puts in advertising, promoting, and building up the good
will of the mark. 50 In essence, the law simply does not allow one
business to “deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the
right to call an article by its name.” 51 Thus, marks such as “Shredded
Wheat,” when used to describe a breakfast biscuit product in pillow-

45 Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Industries Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1001 (2d Cir. 1997);
see also William McGeveran, The Trademark Fairuse Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267,
2202-03 (2010).
46 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.
47 See generally MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:2 (5th ed.
2017).
48 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9-11.
49 Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Panamerican School of Travel, Inc., 648 F. Supp.
1026, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11).
50 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.
51 Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2018], Art. 10

440

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

shaped form, 52 and “Lawyers.Com,” when used to describe services
that will help individuals obtain the legal services of an attorney or law
firm, 53 can never receive trademark protection as it would lead to
unfair competition in the marketplace.
Situated in very close proximity to generic marks on the
Abercrombie spectrum are merely descriptive marks, which are marks
that “convey[] an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or
characteristics of the goods.” 54 These types of marks cannot be
registered under the Lanham Act unless they have acquired “secondary
meaning” or acquired distinctiveness in their relevant marketplaces. 55
In other words, the party seeking registration would have to prove that
the consuming public “primarily associates the term with a particular
source.” 56 For example, the “Park ‘N Fly” mark, when used in
connection with a parking lot service located adjacent to an airport,
was held to be a merely descriptive mark “at best,” because the mark
is a “clear and concise description of a characteristic or ingredient of
the service offered—the customer parks his car and flies from the
airport.” 57 Thus, in order for an applicant to register a merely
descriptive mark such as “Park ‘N Fly” for airport parking services, 58
“Dog Food Products Co.” for a company that manufactures and
distributes dog food, 59 or “Queso Quesadilla Supreme” for a business
that sells Mexican cheeses, 60 the party seeking registration would have
the burden to provide evidence that its mark had acquired
distinctiveness in the product’s relevant market. 61 This can be proved
by direct evidence through the use of consumer survey evidence, or
circumstantial evidence offered by the manufacturer of the mark that
shows the length of time it has utilized the mark in the marketplace,

52

Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 112-13 (1938) (“The plaintiff has no
exclusive right to the use of the term ‘Shredded Wheat’ as a trade name. For that is the generic
term of the article, which describes it with a fair degree of accuracy; and is the term by which
the biscuit in pillow-shaped form is generally known by the public.”).
53 In re Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., 482 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
54 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11.
55 Id.
56 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1992).
57 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 468 U.S. 189, 206 n.3 (1985) (quoting Park
‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1983)).
58 Id.
59 Baff v. Dog & Cat Food Products, 20 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (App. Div. 1940).
60 In re Dos Padres Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1860, 1998 WL 1120831 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
61 Id.
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the quality and quantity of promotional advertising for the mark, and
overall sales that have been attached to the mark. 62
Suggestive marks are the final category of trademark that fall
within the Abercrombie spectrum, and they are notorious for giving the
courts the most difficulty in determining the validity of these marks
because of their close associations with marks that are merely
descriptive. 63 Although the courts have noted that understanding and
analyzing suggestive marks requires the trier of fact to use his or her
“imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the
nature of goods,” 64 a bright line standard has not yet been articulated.
It is well-established, however, that most suggestive marks are
inherently distinctive, and the mark holder does not need to prove that
the mark acquired secondary meaning in order to obtain registration.
One of the most widely cited examples of an inherently distinctive
suggestive mark is the famous “Tide” mark when used in connection
with the sale of laundry detergent soap and cleaning products. 65
iii. Protection against Trademark Infringement
After a mark holder overcomes the initial burden to prove the
mark is valid, trademark law enforces these rights and helps to protect
the good will established by the mark holder. One of these rights, and
perhaps the most critical, is protection against individuals and
companies that infringe upon the good will of the valid mark and seek
to freeride on the success of the senior mark holder’s property rights.
Once it is established that the plaintiff holds a valid mark, the second
inquiry that the courts make is whether the defendant’s use of the mark
has created a likelihood of consumer confusion in the marketplace.
This inquiry has been described as the “keystone” element in a

62

MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15:1 (5th ed. 2017).
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:62 (5th ed. 2017) (“The
distinction between words that ‘suggest’ but do not ‘describe’ can often be a subtle one, but
the distinction can be determinative of the result in many cases in both infringement litigation
and in obtaining federal registration.”); see also Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with
Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 771 (1990) (“The line between descriptive and suggestive
marks is quite a difficult one to draw, and new entrants to product markets often stray quite
close to it.”).
64 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants
& Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
65 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-12 (2000).
63
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trademark infringement action and essential for a plaintiff to prove in
a trademark infringement action. 66
Although the likelihood of consumer confusion might seem
like a difficult element to ascertain, the courts have articulated a
number of tests to help guide them through this critical analysis. The
Sixth Circuit, for example, utilizes an eight-factor test known as the
“Frisch factors” 67 that evaluate the strength of the senior mark;
relatedness of the goods or services; similarity of the marks; evidence
of actual confusion; marketing channels used; likely degree of
purchaser care; the intent of defendant in selecting the mark; and
likelihood of expansion of the product lines,” in order to determine
whether consumers are likely to be confused by the concurrent use of
the marks in similar relevant markets. 68 In similar fashion, the Second
Circuit also utilizes an eight-factor test that has become widely
recognized as the “Polaroid Factors” and evaluates:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the degree of
similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s
marks; (3) the competitive proximity of the products
sold under the marks; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff
will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the
defendant’s good faith, or lack thereof, in adopting its
mark; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product; and (8)
the sophistication of the plaintiff’s customers. 69

66

J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1
(5th ed. 2017).
67 See Frisch’s Restaurants v. Elby’s Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982); see also
Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North America, Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir.
2012).
68 Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying Frisch factors).
69 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). In addition to
Polaroid and Frisch’s factors discussed above, other circuits, including the Federal Circuit,
have articulated their own versions of these likelihood of consumer confusion tests. See
Autozone, Inc. v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2008) (articulating a seven-factor test
which looks at “(1) the similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the
similarity of the products; (3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree and care
likely to be exercised by consumers; (5) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (6) any actual
confusion; and (7) the intent of the defendant to “palm off” his product as that of another.”);
see also Application of E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(applying a thirteen factor test for likelihood of confusion which includes an evaluation of
“[t]he fame of the prior mark” and “[a]ny other established fact probative of the effect of use”);
see also AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (articulating an
eight-factor test known as the “Sleekcraft factors” which looks at “1. strength of the mark; 2.
proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5.
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Although there are subtle differences in the application of these factors
among the circuit courts, the main purpose for implementing these
tests remains the same: triers of fact want to protect consumers in the
marketplace and also protect the good will that manufacturers and
distributors have established in their trademarks though their
investments, research, product design, and promotion of their brand. 70
It is up to the parties, however, to provide the trier of fact with
sufficient evidence to either demonstrate that there is a likelihood of
consumer confusion or not. One of the most common methods utilized
in a trademark infringement action to either prove or rebut the
existence of consumer confusion is survey evidence procured by
expert witnesses. 71
B.

Consumer Confusion Survey Evidence: Its Purpose
and Criticisms

In Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football
Club Ltd. Partnership.,72 Chief Judge Richard Posner explained the
important role that trademarks play in our society and the essential
need for expert testimony in trademark infringement litigation. 73
Posner explained that the opinions of these experts are critical in
helping judges to not only understand, but also “strike a balance”
among a number of competing interests in the marketplace held by
manufactures and consumers. 74 For example, manufacturers of new
products have a legitimate interest in investing a substantial amount of
financial resources into the development of attractive, recognizable
branding to help them stand out in an overcrowded marketplace. 75 On
the other hand, manufacturers of existing products have an interest in
enforcing certain legal protections that they have earned in their marks
to ensure that competitors will not infringe on their good will which
could result in lost sales. 76 Most importantly, the consuming public
marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; 7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the
product lines.”).
70 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
71 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:158 (5th ed.).
72 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
73 Id. at 414-15.
74 Id. at 414.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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wants to know exactly what they are purchasing on the store shelves
without the need for time-consuming and costly investigations into the
source of the products. 77
Given the underlying purpose of trademark law, which is to
protect the consumer while making purchasing decisions, expert
witnesses play a critical role in infringement litigation in determining
the mark’s impact on consumers in any given marketplace—namely,
whether the use of a mark will cause a likelihood of confusion among
these consumers. Although this testimony is critical, Judge Posner also
made it abundantly clear that when it comes to utilizing expert
witnesses to help triers of fact determine whether the defendant’s use
of an allegedly infringing mark would confuse consumers, due to the
adversarial nature of litigation, the reliability of their testimony must
be heavily scrutinized.
Posner criticized one of the major defects in the use of
consumer surveys, explaining that “[m]any experts are willing for a
generous (and sometimes for a modest) fee to bend their science in the
direction from which their fee is coming.” 78 This is alarming because
“[t]he touchstone of liability under [the trademark infringement
statute] is whether the defendant’s use of the disputed mark is likely to
cause confusion among consumers regarding the origin of the goods
offered by the parties.” 79 Interestingly enough, despite his stark
criticism of the survey evidence in general, Posner declared that the
lower court did not commit clear error by crediting the findings of
these studies and admitting them into evidence. 80 According to Posner,
the surveys were not perfect, but “this [was] not news,” as “[t]rials
would be very short if only perfect evidence were admissible.” 81
Instead of excluding this flawed evidence from the record and
requiring the parties to procure survey results that were
methodologically sound, Posner merely expressed hope that the parties
would “take these criticisms to heart in [their] next courtroom
appearance.” 82

77

See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
Indianapolis Colts, Inc., 34 F.3d at 415.
79 Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 280
(6th Cir. 1997).
80 Indianapolis Colts, Inc., 34 F.3d at 416.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 415.
78
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However, if the courts rely on the survey data collected by
expert witnesses to show consumer confusion—data conceded to be
deliberately skewed in favor of the party offering the evidence—this
evidence could become very prejudicial and misleading to a trier of
fact. 83 Under circumstances where the evidence is admittedly
unreliable, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Supreme Court precedent, the consumer survey evidence should not
be admitted into evidence at all. 84 The courts, however, regularly
allow this defective evidence to be admitted at trial and evaluated by
the trier of fact.
In Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 85 for
example, the district court had to determine whether the mark
“CHATEAU DE LEELANAU VINEYARD AND WINERY”
infringed upon the senior mark holder’s “LEELANAU CELLARS”
mark, in Michigan’s consumer wine marketplace. 86 To prove the
existence of consumer confusion at trial, the plaintiff and senior mark
holder offered an expert witness who opined that defendant’s use of
the mark “LEELANAU CELLARS” on its wine bottles was likely to
confuse consumers while making purchasing decisions. 87 The district
court admitted the consumer confusion survey procured by the
plaintiff, despite the court’s conceding that the survey was severely
flawed. The court explained that in regard to the survey, “(1) the
universe of respondents was overbroad and failed to include
individuals who were potential purchasers of [defendant’s product];
(2) the survey did not replicate conditions that consumers would
encounter in the marketplace; and (3) the survey questions were
suggestive and misleading.” 88 Instead of precluding this evidence on
the ground that the survey results impermissibly prejudiced the trier of
fact, the court simply stated that it would “give little weight” to the
survey evidence because the survey did not replicate actual market
conditions. 89
83

See FED. RULES EVID. Rule 403.
See infra Section II.
85 Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 2003 WL 396340 (W.D. Mich. 2003),
rev’d and remanded, 118 Fed. Appx. 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
86 Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 502 F.3d 504, 510 (6th Cir. 2007).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 518.
89 Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 772, 783-84
(W.D.M.S.D. 2006) (“The survey in this case was conducted in a manner that was substantially
at odds with the circumstances under which most consumers encounter Defendants’ wine.”).
84
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Likewise, In Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp.,90
a trademark infringement case involving two international
manufacturers of biscuit style cookies known as “galletas” in Puerto
Rico, both parties utilized survey evidence regarding the issue of
likelihood of confusion as it related to their respective product
packaging designs and labeling. 91 Although the district court gave
“scant evidentiary value” to the defendant’s survey evidence because
of its “small sample size and large margin of error,” which “cast
considerable doubt on its statistical integrity,” the district court still
admitted the results of these findings into evidence. 92
II.

DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
A.

The Daubert Factors and the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 93 is the leading
Supreme Court case used to evaluate the sufficiency and admissibility
of an expert witness’s opinion testimony. In this case, the Court listed
a number of factors to use when evaluating the sufficiency and
admissibility of an expert’s opinion which include the theory’s
testability, the extent to which it “has been subjected to peer review
and publication,” the extent to which a technique is subject to
“standards controlling the technique’s operation,” the “known or
potential rate of error,” and the “degree of acceptance” within the
“relevant scientific community.” 94
Thus, if an expert’s report is not supported by reliable
methodology pursuant to the Daubert factors, a court may exclude this
opinion where “there is simply too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proffered.” 95 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has held that in instances when an expert’s opinion was based

90

443 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2006).
Id. at 114 (explaining that “[Defendant’s] . . . product logo consists of a white oval with
the name “Ricas” centered in red letters and with a red square in the upper right-hand corner
of the oval bearing the white-lettered brand name “Nestlé,” where the plaintiff’s product
consisted of “predominately red-and-white packaging, with the circular logo centered against
a background consisting of rows of the galletas.”).
92 Id. at 121 n.6.
93 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
94 Id. at 593–94.
95 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
91
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“on a faulty assumption due to [the expert’s] failure to apply his stated
methodology reliably to the facts of the case,” these opinions are “not
based on good grounds,” and must be excluded. 96 The lower courts
have also excluded expert opinions and testimony pursuant to Daubert
when they were “based on incorrect factual assumptions that
render[ed] all of [the expert’s] subsequent conclusions purely
speculative.” 97
The mere presence of flaws in the execution of the expert’s
methodology, or mistakes contained within the expert’s report,
however, does not necessarily render the entire opinion invalid and
inadmissible. As the Third Circuit has explained:
[W]e think that the primary limitation on the judge’s
admissibility determinations is that the judge should not
exclude evidence simply because he or she thinks that
there is a flaw in the expert’s investigative process
which renders the expert’s conclusions incorrect. The
judge should only exclude the evidence if the flaw is
large enough that the expert lacks “good grounds” for
his or her conclusions. 98
To determine whether an expert witness has established “good
grounds” for the conclusions he or she is offering to the court, the trier
of fact must determine whether these conclusions “could reliably flow
from the facts known to the expert and methodology used.” 99 This
coincides with the underlying principles set forth in Daubert, which
stands for the proposition that the “ultimate touchstone” for
determining the admissibility of an expert’s opinion is evaluating
whether the implementation of a “technique or principle [is]
sufficiently reliable so that it will aid the jury in reaching accurate
results.” 100
It is therefore alarming that in the context of trademark
infringement litigation, the courts readily allow expert testimony to be
96 Amorgianos v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
97 Macaluso v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11496, 2005 WL 563169, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 10, 2005).
98 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at 746.
99 Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir.1999).
100 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at 744 (quoting DeLuca by DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 945 (3d Cir. 1990).
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admitted into evidence, despite the fact that this testimony is often
based on consumer confusion surveys that are concededly flawed,
poorly designed, unreliable, biased, skewed, and statistically
inaccurate. 101
B.

The Daubert Factors Applied to Trademark
Infringement Litigation: What Constitutes a
Permissible Consumer Confusion Survey?

Although it is well-recognized that consumer confusion survey
evidence that is produced by a qualified expert “should be found
sufficiently reliable and admissible,” 102 “[t]here is no doubt that a trial
court, in the exercise of its ‘gatekeeping function’ may, in an
appropriate case, exclude seriously flawed survey data from being
received into evidence.” 103 However, when the courts readily allow
surveys that utilize flawed methodology to enter into evidence, it
becomes difficult to ascertain the circumstances in which a defective
survey will actually be excluded. To establish what constitutes a
permissible survey pursuant to Daubert, Professor McCarthy provides
substantial guidance as he stresses the importance of maintaining
sound survey methodology, 104 defining a clear and relevant universe
of individuals to survey, 105 and realistically approximating market
conditions. 106
i. Designing a Survey with Sound Methodology
With modern technology expanding exponentially, the
methods by which consumers access the marketplace has been
continuously evolving. As more and more brick and mortar stores
close their doors and begin to expand their e-commerce presence on
the internet, the potential for consumers to experience marketplace
confusion as they browse through thousands of products with a simple
click of a mouse—or a swipe of a finger on most modern mobile

101
102
103
104
105
106

See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:170 (5th ed. 2017).
6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:170 (5th ed. 2017).
6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:163 (5th ed. 2017).
6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:159 (5th ed. 2017).
6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:163 (5th ed. 2017).
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devices—has drastically increased. 107 With these new types of
shopping experiences that individuals are engaging in every single day,
the courts have adapted to these constantly changing marketplace
conditions, sometimes expanding well-settled law that has been in
place for decades in order to ensure that the underlying purposes of
trademark law remain undisturbed. 108
In turn, expert witnesses in trademark infringement litigations
have been required to expand and develop their approach to acquiring
accurate survey data in an era when shopping in a brick and mortar
store has almost become obsolete. Since the courts have explained that
“[a] consumer using the link on the web page to purchase . . . goods is
. . . equivalent [to] a consumer seeing a shelf-talker and taking the item
to the cashier in a store to purchase it,” 109 experts have been forced to
craft surveys that provide accurate data in marketplaces that continue
to evolve. So long as these surveys can approximate actual
marketplace conditions that consumers will experience—either online
or in an actual retail store—experts have a plethora of reliable methods
to utilize to extract this data including in-person interviews, telephone
surveys, and internet surveys. 110
In order for the survey evidence to be reliable, and thus,
admissible in court pursuant to the rigorous Daubert factors:
(1) the [survey’s] “universe” [must be] properly defined
(2) a representative sample of that universe [must be]
selected (3) the questions to be asked of interviewees
[must be] framed in a clear, precise and non-leading
manner, (4) sound interview procedures [must be]
followed by competent interviewers who had no
knowledge of the litigation or the purpose for which the
survey was conducted, (5) the data gathered [must be]
accurately reported, (6) the data [must be] analyzed in
107 See Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015). In this
case, the court determined if Amazon.com infringed plaintiff’s registered trademark when its
search engine provided users with a list of related products sold by plaintiff’s competitors,
instead of indicating that the product was not available on Amazon.com.
108 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137,
1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (adding a ninth factor to the eight-factor likelihood of consumer
confusion test articulated in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) in the
context of internet infringement cases: “the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and
the surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page”).
109 In re Sones, 590 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
110 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:163 (5th ed. 2017).
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accordance with accepted statistical principles and (7)
objectivity of the entire process [must be] assured.
Failure to satisfy one or more of these criteria may lead
to exclusion of the survey 111
ii. Establishing an Appropriate Survey Universe
To create a survey that approximates actual market conditions,
the designer of the survey must first establish an appropriate universe
of individuals who will be participating in the survey. 112 What
constitutes an appropriate universe is entirely dependent on the
relevant product market, the types of goods being sold, and the likely
purchasers of these goods. For example, in the context of a trademark
infringement action involving specialized luxury watches valued
between $15,000 and $1,000,000, an appropriate universe for a
consumer confusion survey would be individuals who either owned, or
would be likely to consider purchasing, a luxury watch in this price
range. 113 In contrast, an appropriate universe for surveys which seek
to evaluate the likelihood of confusion in the context of everyday
products such as lightbulbs and flashlights could consist of the general
population as a whole because virtually everybody purchases these
products. 114
In the alternative, a survey universe can be deemed
inappropriate by the trier of fact. For example, in Weight Watchers
Int’l, Inc., v. Stouffer Corp., 115 the court held that the consumer
confusion survey universe for an infringement action regarding frozen
weight-loss food products was over-inclusive, and thus, inappropriate,
because the survey consisted of participants who “may not have been
in the market for diet food of any kind.” 116 In Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 117 the court held that the consumer confusion
survey universe for an infringement action regarding athletic running
shoes was under-inclusive, and thus, inappropriate, because the
111

6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:53 (5th ed. 2017).
6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:159 (5th ed. 2017).
113 Audemars Piguet Holding S.A. v. Swiss Watch Intern., Inc., 2014 WL 47465 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 6, 2014).
114 See 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:160 (5th ed. 2017)
(citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976)).
115 744 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
116 Id. at 1272.
117 533 F. Supp. 75 (S.D. Fla 1981).
112
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universe of survey participants only included “spectators and
participants at running events in the Washington-Baltimore area,”
which was “far too narrow to give a fair indication of whether the
consuming public associates the [design with plaintiff’s] shoes.”118
Finally, the courts have held that if the geographic area in which the
survey is being conducted does not accurately represent the relevant
market to be tested, the survey universe may be deemed inappropriate,
which results in the survey evidence being given little weight. 119
It is extremely important for a consumer confusion survey to
be administered to the appropriate universe of participants because in
order to “be probative and meaningful,” the survey questions “must
rely upon responses by potential consumers of the products in
question.” 120 This is true because survey participants are not likely to
purchase the relevant product—or even consider purchasing the
product within a reasonable amount of time—the participant will be
less observant in the marketplace, will be less observant when exposed
to the product’s advertisements, and will not be able to distinguish the
product in question from others in the same relevant marketplace. 121
Furthermore, it is critical that the surveyor takes steps to ensure that
the survey is properly executed, all of the questions are answered, and
it is confirmed that data are only being extracted from respondents who
belong in the defined survey universe. 122
Interestingly enough, however, despite the factors that the
United States Supreme Court articulated in Daubert to help determine
reliability, and despite the guidance given by the courts in determining
what constitutes a permissible consumer confusion survey, seriously
flawed surveys administered with “sloppy execution” 123 and
“methodological errors” 124 are still regularly admitted into evidence.
As discussed below, this questionable practice has an undesirable,
prejudicial, and drastic impact on high-stakes trademark infringement
litigation that can easily be remedied with a consistent application of a
Daubert analysis prior to a survey’s admission.

118

Id. at 80.
6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:161 (5th ed. 2017).
120 744 F. Supp. at 1273 (quoting Dreyfus Fund Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp.
1108, 1116 (S.D.N.Y.1981).
121 Id. at 1273.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1272-73
124 Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
119

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2018], Art. 10

452
III.

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

TIFFANY AND CO. V. COSTCO

In November of 2012, Tiffany & Co., one of the most famous
and iconic diamond jewelers in the world, was informed by an
individual shopping at a Costco Wholesale Club in Huntington Beach,
California, that the bulk discount store was advertising and promoting
Tiffany rings for sale in its stores. 125 Tiffany promptly conducted an
investigation into whether Costco was illegally selling and advertising
Tiffany’s trademarked jewelry in its stores—conduct that would
authorize Tiffany to pursue a trademark infringement and possible
counterfeit sale of goods action. 126 The result of this investigation
showed that Costco was utilizing large promotional display signs
above its jewelry counter that prominently featured the name,
“Tiffany,” to advertise diamond rings that featured “Tiffany” in the
description. 127 Since Costco was not authorized or licensed to sell or
promote any of Tiffany’s registered marks, the jeweler contacted
Costco and demanded that it remove these rings and signage from its
wholesale stores. 128 Tiffany commenced this litigation by filing a
complaint which alleged trademark infringement on Valentine’s Day
in 2013 and moved for summary judgment. 129
Upon the completion of discovery by both parties, and the
subsequent filings of motions and briefs, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Tiffany, holding that the company
owned a valid mark that was entitled to trademark protection, and that
Costco’s use of that mark was likely to cause consumer confusion—
the two elements that a plaintiff must satisfy to prevail on a Lanham
Act trademark infringement claim. 130
First, because Tiffany has used its marks “Tiffany,” “Tiffany
& Co.” and “T & Co.” in commerce and registered on the registrar
since 1868, the law provides the mark with both prima facie evidence
of validity and incontestable status, which provides conclusive
evidence of validity. 131 Thus, the burden was placed on Costco to
125

Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 245.
Id. at 246, 254-55.
127 Id. at 245.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 245-46.
130 Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 245-47.
131 Id. at 247. See also 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:141
(5th ed.) (“One of the significant advantages of federal registration on the Principal Register
is that after five consecutive years of continuous use and the satisfaction of certain formalities,
126
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challenge the validity of the mark’s certificate of registration to prevail
on its defense that it did not infringe upon Tiffany’s mark. 132 Instead
of challenging the validity of the registration, however, Costco decided
to argue that the word “Tiffany” had become a generic term for a
pronged ring setting. 133
Because Costco was not able to provide the court with
sufficient evidence that “Tiffany” had become generic and therefore
subject to cancellation, the court rejected the argument in its entirety
and held that the first prong of proving infringement had been
satisfied. 134 It then began to analyze the more interesting and
controversial prong of the infringement analysis in this case: likelihood
of consumer confusion.
To determine the likelihood of consumer confusion, the Second
Circuit utilizes the eight-factor Polaroid test to determine whether the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark constitutes trademark
infringement. 135 Although the district court held that Costco failed to
offer any evidence which “raise[d] a disputed issue of material fact
with respect to any of the Polaroid factors,” 136 this article will focus on
only one of these factors: actual confusion.
A. Actual Confusion
As previously discussed, evidence of consumer confusion is
the “keystone” element of a trademark infringement claim. 137 This
type of evidence can either be anecdotal in nature—meaning that a
consumer can offer sworn testimony that he or she was actually
confused by the use of the defendant’s mark in commerce—or it can
be extracted through the use of consumer survey evidence. Over fierce
objection by Costco which challenged the reliability and credibility of
§ 15 of the Lanham Act provides that the right of the registrant to use the registered mark shall
be incontestable. . . . Section 33(b) provides that if the right to use has become incontestable
under § 15, then the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered
mark and its registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s
“exclusive right to use” the registered mark on the goods or services.”) (citing Lanham Act §
33(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
136 Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 247 (emphasis added).
137 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1
(5th ed. 2017).
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plaintiff’s expert witness, Tiffany provided both anecdotal and survey
evidence to the court, which the court gave significant weight to before
ruling in favor of the famous diamond jeweler. 138
i. Anecdotal Evidence
With respect to the actual evidence of confusion that Tiffany
offered to the court, the company compiled the barebones deposition
statements of six Costco customers, who all claimed to be confused by
the promotional signs and advertisements in the wholesale club. 139 The
extent of this heavily weighted anecdotal evidence of actual confusion
was as follows: (1)”Maria Bentley, for instance, testified that she was
brought to tears when the diamond fell out of the ring she purchased at
Costco because she believed that she had purchased a genuine Tiffany
ring.” 140 (2) Karina Roberts replied, “[a]bsolutley,” after being asked
if she believed that she purchased a genuine Tiffany ring from
Costco. 141 (3) Joseph Bentley replied, “[y]es, I did,” after being asked
if he believed had purchased a genuine Tiffany ring at a good price
after leaving Costco. 142
According to the court, this deposition testimony “provide[d]
concrete evidence of consumer confusion.” 143 Thus, because Costco
failed to offer any evidence that “affirmatively demonstrate[ed] that
consumers were not confused by its use of the Tiffany word mark in
display case signs,” the court gave great weight to Tiffany on the actual
confusion factor of the Polaroid analysis. 144 Even if this result is
labeled as poor lawyering on behalf of Costco’s legal counsel, who
easily could have procured the testimony of consumers who would
have countered these claims and raised a genuine issue of fact disputed
at the summary judgment stage, there is still an argument to be made
that the court impermissibly credited too much weight to these
statements and not enough weight to the arguments advanced by
Costco in regard to the other evidence Tiffany offered to demonstrate
consumer confusion.

138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 254.
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 251.
Id.
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ii. Consumer Confusion Survey Evidence
In addition to the deposition testimony offered by Tiffany, the
company also offered the expert opinion and testimony of Dr. Jacob
Jacoby who conducted a consumer confusion survey that concluded
that Costco’s use of the word “Tiffany” in its in-store signage,
promotions, and advertisements caused consumer confusion. 145
Costco objected to the admission of this survey into evidence, arguing
that the survey failed to satisfy any of the Daubert prongs.
Specifically, Costco attacked the survey because “(i) it utilized false,
built-in assumptions; (ii) it utilized oversimplified, misleading and
erroneous instructions; (iii) it utilized contrived and artificial stimuli
that either omitted context necessary for disambiguation or provided
false and misleading ‘context’; (iv) it was administered to the wrong
subject population; (v) and it did not properly address whether Tiffany
was a generic term for the specific ‘genus at issue in this case.’” 146
As previously discussed, for a survey to be admissible pursuant
to the rigorous standards set forth in Daubert, the survey must use
sound methodology, must be designed to test only an appropriate
universe of participants, and most importantly, approximate actual
marketplace conditions. 147 The first objection that Costco made to this
survey design was that the universe of individuals surveyed was
under-inclusive, and thus, not appropriate. 148 Costco argued that
because this survey only included a population of consumers who
would consider purchasing an expensive diamond ring from Costco,
and not a population of individuals with a “present purchase interest
in buying a diamond ring,” the beliefs and views of these participants
were severely skewed. 149 The crux of Costco’s objection with the
survey was that it did not approximate market conditions for past or
future purchasers of expensive diamond engagement rings. This is
true, according to Costco, because consumers in this particular market
would exercise a heightened level of care before making a purchase of
an expensive diamond ring, would be more familiar with the

145

Id. at 249-51.
Id. at 250.
147 See infra Section II, B and accompanying notes.
148 Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 250; see also 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:161 (5th ed. 2017).
149 Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 250.
146
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vocabulary and vernacular associated with an upscale jewelry
purchase, and would be more sophisticated overall. 150
However, because the court gave such substantial weight to the
deposition testimony of the Costco customers discussed above, it held
that evidence “corroborated” the findings of the consumer confusion
survey, despite any flaws that the survey might have had. 151 The court
went on to say that any “criticism of Dr. Jacoby’s survey is just that:
criticism.” 152 Since Costco failed to provide any affirmative evidence
to counter the evidence offered by Tiffany, the court held in Tiffany’s
favor on the issue of actual confusion. 153
B. What About Daubert?
Although Costco raised a number of objections on a Daubert
motion seeking to exclude the testimony offered by Dr. Jacoby, the
court quickly dismissed the objections and focused only on the fact
that Tiffany used a survey, which has consistently been upheld as a
reliable scientific method pursuant to Daubert. 154 However, the broad
inquiry as to the method itself was the end of the court’s Daubert
analysis and there was virtually no discussion as to the actual
methodology of the survey, which was called into question for
containing severe, if not fatal, flaws. If the survey contained false and
misleading questions, did not extract data from an appropriate
universe, and contained erroneous instructions, this is clearly the type
of unreliable “junk science” that Daubert seeks to exclude from
evidence. 155 This type of survey fails to stay within the bounds of the
acceptable parameters explained by Professor McCarthy, which
requires the surveyor to design the survey in a manner which
approximates actual market conditions. 156
But if the survey did not satisfy any of the factors set forth in
Daubert, and it was not designed in a methodologically sound way that
would facilitate the extraction of accurate data, how did the court
justify its admission into evidence? It simply stated that any of these
150

Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 258-59.
155 Id. at 258.
156 THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:163
(5th ed. 2017).
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flaws or procedural errors in the survey went to the “weight, rather than
the admissibility, of Tiffany’s consumer confusion evidence.”157
However, this explanation is contrary to decisions of other courts
within the same circuit that have excluded survey evidence that was
designed and executed with flawed and unreliable methodology. 158
In sum, had the district court engaged in a comprehensive
Daubert evaluation, which assesses the statistical margin of error,
reliability of the methodology, and the overall scientific nature of the
survey, it would have likely excluded the survey on the ground that it
was not properly designed and thus extremely prejudicial to Costco’s
defense. In turn, the shoddy examples of anecdotal evidence of actual
confusion offered by Tiffany would not have had any impact on the
overall admissibility of the flawed survey. Finally, following the
ruling of summary judgment in favor of Tiffany, which led to a jury
award of damages in the tens of millions of dollars, perhaps the jury
would not have had such distain for Costco, which would have
drastically reduced the punitive damages awarded to Tiffany. 159
IV.

CONCLUSION

This note was not intended to challenge the merits of Tiffany’s
infringement claim pursuant to the Lanham Act or even defend actions
by Costco that might have very well been bad faith efforts to infringe
upon the good will of a jewelry company that has dominated the
marketplace for almost 150 years. Instead, this note’s main focus is to
urge the courts to implement and evaluate the standards set forth in
Daubert whenever they are faced with challenges regarding the
methodology utilized in a survey that is being offered as evidence in a
trademark infringement action. Although no evidence is perfect, this
author argues that the courts have a heightened obligation to evaluate
flaws in consumer survey evidence, as this type of evidence is very

157

Tiffany and Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d at 254.
See LVL XIII Brands, Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 209 F. Supp. 3d 612, 643
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (readily applying the Daubert factors in trademark infringement action to
exclude expert testimony based on faulty, unreliable survey methodology).
159
On September 8, 2017, Costco filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit seeking to reverse the jury verdict entered by the trial court on
the ground that the total damages awarded to Tiffany was excessive and violated due process.
Tiffany and Company v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2017),
appeal docketed, No. 17-2798 (2d Cir. 2017). The appeal is still pending at the time of this
publication.
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often the only evidence that parties are able to produce to establish a
likelihood of confusion—the most critical element in a trademark
infringement action.
When parties can essentially buy their experts and pay them to
produce the type of evidence that will make them successful at trial,
and when juries are readily awarding damages worth over twentymillion dollars based on a few short statements by customers, the least
that courts can do is entertain credible and well-founded objections to
the admissibility of the evidence.
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